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Democratic Backsliding and the Rule of Law
TOM GINSBURG*

Ours is an era of democratic recession and backsliding. In this essay, I
consider some of the causes and consequences of these developments, as well
as laying out the modalities of democratic decline. I then focus in more detail
on the rule of law and the courts as crucial institutions that can help protect
democracy while also showing that they are increasingly a target for
democratic backsliding. Finally, I speculate on some of the factors that can
lead to the survival of courts in the face of sustained attacks. In doing so, I
draw on my recent work, some of it co-authored with my colleague Aziz Z.
Huq, in which I explore these issues.'
I.

THE RISK OF ELECTIVE DESPOTISM

Let us first start with some facts. The number of democracies around the
world has declined every year since 2006.2 There has also been an increase
in the number of hardline authoritarian regimes. 3 There have been some
notable cases of failure in long-enduring democracies: Venezuela, which was
continually democratic for several decades, began to erode under the

* Leo Spitz Professor of International Law, University of Chicago Law School. My thanks to Aziz Huq
for extended discussions on these themes, which inform our book, How TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY (2018).

1. See e.gs., Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 65 UCLA L.
REV. 78, 92-98 (2018); TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ HUQ, How TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

35-47 (2018) [hereinafter HOW TO SAVE].
2. Freedom House, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (2017), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/freedom-world-2017.
3. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index notes in its survey of 129 countries that as of 2016, the
number of hardline autocracies has risen from 33 to 40, the most in the 1 1-year history of the biennial
survey. Executive Summary: Increasing Political and Social Tensions, 2016 BTI 1, 4 (2016),
https://www.btiproject.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/ZusaetzlicheDownloads/ExecutiveSummar
yBTI 2016.pdf.
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influence of populist strongman Hugo Chavez, who was elected in 1999.4 In
2017, his self-appointed successor, Nicolas Maduro, completed the process
by establishing a new constituent assembly to bypass the democratically
elected Congress, which was necessary because the opposition had won an
election there.
In other cases, backsliding has occurred in countries whose democracies
were relatively new, and dated only to the so-called "Third Wave" of
democratization around the world, but were nevertheless considered to be
fairly robust.6 In the literature, a democracy is considered to be consolidated
when it is "the only game in town." 7 This term had been applied to countries
like Poland and Hungary in the European Union, whose dramatic departure
from communism had been a major event in the "Third Wave."8 But as of
2018, democracy in both countries was in serious trouble. Hungarian Prime
Minister Viktor Orbin had presided over a systematic undermining of some
aspects of the prior system, even while maintaining elections. He calls his
model "illiberal democracy", a scheme in which the "rights of the majority"
take precedence over those of minorities, and he has used demagoguery and
manipulation of the public sphere to erode Hungarian democracy in practice. 9
Even in established democracies, the rise of populist and right-wing parties
suggests that the traditional mechanisms of democratic representation are
weakening all around the world. In the United States, President Donald
Trump's election has caused a good deal of hand-wringing, with some
believing that democracy is under threat.1 0 In 2016, the EIU's Democracy
Index demoted the United States from "full democracy" to "flawed
democracy."" The Index is an average of the scores of five categories, which

4. Zeeshawn Aleem, How Venezuela went from a rich democracy to a dictatorshipon the brink
ofcollapse, VOX.COM, (Sept. 19. 2017, 9:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/19/16189742/
venezuela-maduro-dictator-chavez-collapse.
5. Id.
6. See SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE (1991) (describing democracy's third wave).
7.

ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET 26 (1991) ("Democracy is consolidated

when under given political and economic conditions a particular system of institutions becomes the only
game in town, when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, when all the losers
want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost.")
8.

CHRIS HASSELMANN, POLICY REFORM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 23 (2017)

(describing these countries as consolidated).
9. Gabor Halmai, A Coup Against Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Hungary, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES (Mark Graber et al, eds., 2018); Jan-Werner Miller, Taking 'Illiberal
Democracy'Seriously, PUBLIC SEMINAR (July 21, 2017), http://www.publicseminar.org/2017/07/takingilliberal-democracy-seriously/.
10. See CAN IT HAPPEN HERE? (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2018) (collecting essays that consider the
proposition); See also STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL A. ZIBLATT, How DEMOCRACIES DIE (2017)

(discussing President Trump's assault on norms that are a part of how democracy works).
I1. Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2016, THE ECONOMIST http://felipesahagun.es/
wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Democracy-Index-2016.pdf.
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are derived from sixty different "indicators." 1 2 The categories are "electoral
process and pluralism;" "civil liberties;" "functioning of government;"
"political participation;" and "political culture." 13 Countries with a score of
8-10 are considered "full democracies" while countries with a score of 6-7.99
are considered "flawed democracies." 14 Due to a slight decrease, the United
States score fell from 8.05 in 2015 to 7.98 in 2016.15 Four of the five
component scores which make up its Democracy Index remained identical
from 2015, while a reduction of 0.36 in its "functioning of government" score
led to it slipping below the threshold of "full democracy." This was
accompanied by a demotion from twentieth place (the most "flawed" of the
"full democracies") to a tie with Italy for twenty-first place (the second
Other flawed
highest score for "flawed democracies" after Japan).1 6
democracies listed in the report include France, South Korea, Israel, India,
Brazil, and Senegal. 17
There are numerous diagnoses for what is causing this wave of
democratic erosion. Some scholars emphasize the weakening of political
parties, whose hold on the popular imagination has suffered from infighting
and lack of responsiveness. In most western democracies, argues Kim Lane
Scheppele, parties used to be organized on class-based lines, with a left-right
With
divide that was fairly easy to comprehend and quite stable."
globalization and economic change, the left-right divide is no longer as salient
as it once was. The globalization explanation finds resonance with other
scholars, such as David Schneiderman, who emphasizes the hollowing out of
democratic decision-making, as more and more substantive decisions are
made by unaccountable actors in supra-national or international institutions. 19
Globalization is also a cause of economic inequality, which Ganesh
Sitaraman locates as the central driver of the current trend.2 0

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 52.
Id
Id at 54.
Id at 3.
Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 11, at 7.
Id at 7-9.

18.

Kim Lane Scheppele, The Party 's Over, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES IN CRISIS 2 (Mark

Graber et al. eds., 2018) (parties overwhelmed by "insidious infighting, ideological drift or credibility
collapse.")
19. David Schneiderman, Disabling Constitutional Capacity: Global Economic Law and
Democratic Decline, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES IN CRISIS (Mark Graber et al. eds., 2018)

(shrinking of policy space for democratic decision-making).
20.

Ganesh Sitaraman, Economic Inequality and ConstitutionalDemocracy, in CONSTITUTIONAL

DEMOCRACIES IN CRISIS (Mark Graber et al. eds., 2018) (inequality); Ganesh Sitaraman, THE CRISIS OF
THE MIDDLE CLASS CONSTITUTION: WHY ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC 5 (2017).
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Democratic breakdowns can take a number of distinct paths: military
coup, incumbent takeover, civil war, or a popular revolt. 2 1 According to a
recent study by Milan Svolik, among ninety authoritarian reversals up to
2008, 61% involved a military coup, 30% involved an incumbent takeover,
7% involved civil war, and only 2% occurred through revolution. 22 But over
time the proportions have changed, and incumbent takeovers now outnumber
military coups by a good deal.23
With my colleague Aziz Huq, I have grappled with some of these issues
in a book entitled How to Save a ConstitutionalDemocracy, in which we
analyze the problem through a constitutional lens and also provide some
suggestions for what might be done.24 One of our points is that the risk in our
current moment is not the same as that which has informed the field of
comparative constitutional law.25 For several decades, the primary approach
to thinking about constitutional design to defend democracy has been that
associated with the German political scientist Karl Lowenstein, who coined
the term "militant democracy" in 1937.26 Under this approach, the
preservation of democratic order may require, on occasion, steps that are
formally anti-democratic, to undermine political forces that are hostile to
democracy itself.2 7 These steps may on their own interfere with core
freedoms such as those protecting individual expression, freedom of religion,
or freedom of association, in order to preserve the democratic system itself.28
The idea is that democracy, if completely unhindered, can allow an antidemocratic political force to take power through the ballot box, and then
cease to continue to hold elections. 29 The paradigm, of course, dates back to
the era of Nazi Germany, when this was precisely the dynamic that
occurred.30 Postwar democracies such as Germany allowed the courts to ban
undemocratic political parties. 3 1 A recent example occurred in South Korea,
when the country's Constitutional Court banned a party that was associated
with the North Korean regime.32
21. Milan Svol ik, Which DemocraciesWill Last? Coups, Incumbent Takeovers, andthe Dynamics
ofDemocraticConsolidation, 45 BRIT. J. POL. Sci., 715, 730 (2015).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 735.
&

24. How TO SAVE, supra note 1. See also CAN IT HAPPEN HERE?, supra note 10; LEVITSKY
ZIBLATT, supra note 10; YASCHA MOUNK, THE PEOPLE VS. DEMOCRACY (2018).

25. Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 110.
26. Karl Lowenstein, MilitantDemocracy and FundamentalRights, I, 31 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417
(1937); see generally, Patrick Macklen, Militant Democracy, Legal Pluralism, and the Paradoxof SelfDetermination, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 488 (2006).
27. Id at 424.
28. Id
29. Id. at 424-25.
30. Id at 426.
31. Lownestein, supra note 26, at 427.
32. South Korea CourtBans Pro-NorthParty, BBC (Dec. 19,2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/
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In the modem era, however, the steps in democratic backsliding are much
subtler and more incremental, and the militant democracy paradigm is
insufficient to prevent it. As Huq and I argue, the present danger today is not
so much the sudden collapse of democracy, but instead its erosion in a series
of small individual steps that, each on their own, may not appear alarming."
Like the proverbial boiling frog, we may only notice the danger when it is too
late.34 For today's potential autocrat does not seek to end elections but to
Democratic forms are
keep them in place, without. ever losing them.
but the content of the
elections,
and
preserved, with courts, constitutions,
36
elections is more or less foreordained.
The situation recalls James Madison's warning in Federalist 48 in his
justification of the separation of powers:
An elective despotism was not the government we fought for; but one
which should not only be founded on free principles, but in which the
powers of government should be so divided and balanced among
several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their
legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the
others.3 7
Elective despotism is the risk we face and, if democracy is to survive, must
confront.
II.

THE PATHWAYS TO EROSION

In our analysis, Huq and I focus on five distinct modalities of democratic
backsliding.38 The first is constitutional amendments to consolidate power;
in some cases, the would-be autocrats will convene a constitutuent assembly
to advance their efforts. 39 This is of particular importance to populists, who
emphasize the unity of the people in whose name they claim to be speaking.
The practice of convening constitutuent assemblies is somewhat
controversial, and some scholars argue that they are necessary to break
world-asia-30544469.
33. Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 117.
34. How TO SAVE, supra note 1, at 78; See also Wojciech Sadurski, How Democracy Dies (in
Poland): A Case Study of AntiConstitutionalPopulist Backsliding (Sydney Law School Legal Studies

Research Paper No. 18/01 Jan. 2018), at 5 at: http://ssrn.com/abstract-3103491 ("it is difficult to identify
a tipping point during the events: no single new law, decision or transformation seems sufficient to cry
wolf; only ex-post do we realize that the line dividing liberal democracy from a fake one has been crossed:
threshold moments are not seen as such when we live in them.")
35. Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 122.
36. Id.
37. FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison).
38. Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 1; How TO SAVE, supra note 1, at 72-73, 91-116 (describing
mechanisms).
39. David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism,47 U.C. DAVISL.R. 189, 193 (2013).
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through gridlock and crises of representation.40 Yet it is not clear in every
case that the constituent assembly is truly broad- based, and representative.
In some cases, as in Russia, the members were selected by the President
himself.41 In others, such as the Venezuelan assembly refered to above, they
are associated with only one side of the political divide.4 2
Second, agents of erosion will sometimes seek to bypass the checks and
balances of other political branches, for example by packing the courts or
undermining legislatures.4 3 Actually, these first two strategies were both in
evidence when Nicolas Maduro chose to bypass the legislature by govern
through a new constituent assembly, as described above. The Venezuelan
regime, however, had earlier packed the Supreme Court and replaced judges
who were hostile to its program.44 Similarly, when the Fidesz party took
power in Hungary in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, it
amended the constitution to cement its hold on power. 45 Among other things,
reforms reduced the retirement age for justices on the constitutional court,
forcing sitting judges to retire and giving OrbAn the opportunity to appoint a
majority of justices.4 6 Later, the Fidesz parliament passed a statute voiding
the entire earlier jurisprudence of the constitutional court.47
A third modality is to erode the rule of law and the institutions that protect
it by consolidating power in the executive. 48 This can mean attacking
prosecutors, but also seeking to purge the bureaucracy, whose neutral
application of law is an underappreciated feature of democratic governance. 4 9
Because the rule of law by definition places leaders under constraints, it is a
threat to those who wish to consolidate power. Purging bureaucracies and
abusing prosecutorial powers are standard fare among would-be autocrats.5 0
Fourth, would-be autocrats seek to degrade the public sphere by
manipulating the information environment and attacking or controlling the
media and academia.5 ' In Hungary, for example, Orbin has systematically
used licensing and other requirements to favor media firms aligned with his

40.

Joshua Braver, Constituent Power as ExtraordinaryAdaptation 2-3 https://papers.ssrn.com/so

13/papers.cfm?abstract id=3022221.
41. William Partlett, Elite Transitionsin Constitution-Making,56 VA. J. INT'LL. 407,412-14,433,
447-57 (2016).
42. See text at supra note 5.
43. HOW TO SAVE, supra note 1, at 95-101.
44. Aleem, supra note 4.
45. Halmai, supra note 9, at 4.
46. Id. at 6.
47. Id.
48. HOW TO SAVE, supra note 1, at 101-07.
49. Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 160.
50. Id. at 130.
51. Id. at 107-13.
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political movement.5 2 At the same time, he has launched an attack on the
Central European University, an institution set up in the early years of the
Third Wave by George Soros.53 Orbdin has used demonization of Soros to
attack academic freedom, ultimately forcing the university to move its
headquarters out of Hungary.54
Finally, and most directly, autocrats seek to manipulate elections.5 5 As
Joseph Stalin is claimed to have remarked, "It is enough that the people know
there was an election. The people who cast the votes decide nothing. The
people who count the votes decide everything." 56 Controlling the electoral
machinery is thus crucial. When autocrats are seeking to cement their rule,
they can use the electoral machinery to draw boundaries, screen candidates
and count the votes. For example, when President Daniel Ortega was running
for his third term of office in 2016, the electoral council ousted the main
opposition.5 7
The particular mix of different strategies used will depend on contextual
factors: in countries where the legislature is powerful, controlling it becomes
central but may also be more difficult to achieve. In such a context,
expanding executive decree power may be a channel of erosion. If freedoms
of expression are robust, then undermining the very notion of truth through
claims of "fake news" becomes a useful strategy. Terrorism and conspiracy
laws provide a nice set of opportunities to clamp down on political opponents,
and a genuine emergency-such as the failed 2016 coup against Recep Tayip
Erdogan in Turkey-can be followed up with severe purges of the
bureaucracy and courts, as well as roundups of political opponents.
In the next section I focus especially on legal institutions as targets of
backsliding pressure, and then examine whether international institutions and
regional organizations can play a role in defending them.. The justification
for this focus is that courts are lynchpin institutions in our era. Just as
judicialization has greatly expanded in recent decades, it has made courts
more powerful in many countries, deciding issues of what Ran Hirschl calls
52. Halmai, supra note 9, at 19.
53. Yojana Sharma, CEUPresidentResists Move to Vienna After Orban Victory, University World
News (April 11,2018),http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20180411141119286.
54. Id.
55. Halmai, supranote 9, at 6.
56. See Joseph Stalin Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE.COM, https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/
j/josephstall09571.html. The actual remark seems to have been something like "I consider it completely
unimportant who in the party will vote, or how; but what is extraordinarily important is this - who
will count the votes, and how." Joseph Stalin, It's Not the People that Vote that Count,SNOPES.COM
https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/stalin-vote-count-quote/.
57. Nicaragua President Re-Elected in Landslide Amid Claims of Rigged Vote, THE GUARDIAN
(Nov. 7, 2016, 11:52 AM) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/07/nicaragua-president-danielortega-reelected-landslide-vote-rigging.
58. HOWTO SAVE, supra note 1, at 179.
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"Mega-Politics."" Any institution that becomes powerful, however, will
itself become a target for power-seekers, and judicial power is no exception.
As courts have become more important it was only a matter of time before
they become a target for political takeover. In addition, courts supervise
many other elements in the political system. If the courts are safely in control,
a putative authoritarian or illiberal democrat can take over many other aspects
of the system.
WHY COURTS ARE IMPORTANT

III.

Courts can be critical institutions to protect democracy from backsliding.
Indeed, each of the channels of erosion described above invites a particular
set of court responses. The judicial power to set aside legislation, the power
to serve as a check on majoritarian erosion, and the power of constitutional
review has spread all over the world in recent years.6 0 Indeed, in 1910, less
than a quarter of constitutions provided for any power of judicial review. A
Constitutional judicial review
century later the figure was roughly 80%.
provides an arena in which courts can play a role protecting democracy,
though it is not the only one.
Consider first the channel of constitutional amendment. In recent years,
a doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments has spread around
the world, allowing courts to set aside amendments that have been passed in
a procedurally correct manner. Sometimes, courts use explicit language
about unamendability to leverage their decisions in these cases.6 2 In others,
however, the court positions itself as the keeper of the "basic structure" of the
constitution, or relies on the unwritten or customary constitutional norms. 63
Using these arguments, courts have struck amendments on topics ranging
from to the design of the legislative bodies to the location of the capital city
to a ban on headscarves. 64 Clearly, a court that is attuned to the risk of
democratic backsliding ought to strongly consider a version of this doctrine,
specifically with regard to the consolidation of power in a single individual
or a party that seeks to exclude others from competition.
Term limits are a particularly important topic in this regard, given the
phenomenon of "incumbent takeover" described above. When an incumbent
does not want to leave office, but finds them self-limited by term limits, it is
very tempting to try to amend the Constitution to remain in office. In prior
59. Ran Hirschl, The JudicializationofMega-Politics, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI 93 (2008).
60. Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, Why do Countries Adopt ConstitutionalReview?, 30 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 587, 587 (2013).
61. HoWTO SAVE, supra note 1, at 187.
62.

YANIV ROZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 6 (2017).

63. Id.
64. Id.
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work, I have showed that incumbents who try to do so are typically successful
in getting around term limits. 6 5

Should courts let them do so? It can be very difficult for a court to stand
up to an entrenched executive. But sometimes they do so, and can in some
sense help to save constitutional democracy. Consider Colombia under
President Alvaro Uribe, who served from 2002-2010. The Constitution of
1991 had a one-term limit for the presidency, which was part of the careful
crafting of the document so as to prevent strongman rule.66 But after his
defeat of groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),
Uribe was wildly popular, and his allies in Congress passed a constitutional
amendment to allow him a second term.67 In 2005, the Colombian
Constitutional Court upheld the amendment, but it also said that there was a
basic core of the constitutional order, that might in the future allow the court
to prohibit amendments even if they were adopted in a procedurally correct
manner. 6 8 Five years later, the still-popular Uribe attempted to pass another
constitutional amendment to seek a third term, this time through a
referendum. 69 This time, the Constitutional Court (with four out of nine
members having been appointed by Uribe) rejected the proposed referendum
on procedural grounds, asserting that it would mark an extra-constitutional
replacement of the constitutional scheme as a whole.7 0
Professor David Landau notes that this helped to "prevent a significant
erosion of democracy by preventing a strong president from holding onto
power indefinitely."n Writing with Professor Rosalind Dixon, he also notes
that a third term would have given Uribe "tremendous power over various
institutions of state, including those institutions charged with checking
him." 7 2 Accepting the Court's decision, Uribe did not run, designating his
defense minister Juan Manuel Santos as his successor. Santos subsequently
served two terms and has now ceded power. Arguably, one can point to the
2010 decision of the Constitutional Court as marking a critical juncture in
Colombian democracy.
To be sure, this doctrine of unconstitutional amendments provides a good
deal of power to the courts. While courts can prevent leaders from sticking
65. Tom Ginsburg et al, On the Evasion ofExecutive Term Limits, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1807,
1847-48 (2011).
66. COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LEADING CASES, 342 (2017).

67.
68.

Id at 342-4.
Id at 345.

69.

Id at 351-52.

70. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], octubre 19, 2005, Sentencia C-1040/05.
See David Landau & Manuel Cepeda Espinosa, COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LEADING CASES ch.
11(2017).
71. Landau, supra note 39, at 203.
72. Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, TransnationalConstitutionalismand a Limited Doctrine of
UnconstitutionalConstitutionalAmendment, 13 INT'L J. CONST. L. 606, 617 (2015).
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around for too long, they can also utilize this power to free leaders who would
otherwise be constrained. The saga of term limits in Honduras illustrates the
point. In 2009, when the sitting president, Manual Zelaya, proposed a nonbinding referendum on the idea of constitutional change, the Supreme Court
held that he had violated the terms of Article 374 of the Constitution.73 The
decision provided that term limits were unamendable, and that anyone
proposing a change would immediately lose office.74 Zelaya was sent out of
the country by the military. But in 2015, Constitutional Chamber of the
Supreme Court reversed itself. It not only ruled against the concept of nonamendability, but it also, in a unanimous decision, annulled the very
constitutional provisions that constrained presidential reelection, saying that
they conflicted with the core values of freedom of speech and thought, as well
as electoral choice. 75 As Professor Landau and his co-authors wrote, "what
is particularly striking about the case is that these provisions were not later
amendments to the constitution, but rather parts of the original 1982
constitution itself." 7 6
Consider the next modality of backsliding, namely attempts by an
executive to undermine the separation of powers and accountability
institutions. Here courts can do a bit more by defending the prerogatives of
other branches of government. While it is true that in separation of powers
disputes, judges often prefer to allow the elected branches to reach a
negotiated solution, they need not do so. For example, they can issue orders
in support of legislative investigations. In this sense they can help other
government actors help to ensure accountability.
A good example of courts stepping up in this regard is provided by the
recent role of the South African Constitutional Court in the removal of
President Jacob Zuma. Zuma's corruption was notorious, but his allies in
the African National Congress, which controlled the parliament, were doing
nothing to constrain him. This meant that there was a real risk of the erosion
of democracy itself, not because parliament was bypassed but because it was
ineffective. In this context, the Constitutional Court played an interesting and
important role. It acted several times throughout the Zuma saga to both
protect opposition rights within the parliament, to require parliament itself to
have mechanisms for accountability. For the first issue, the Court strongly
suggested that votes on motions of no confidence in the president had to be

73. David Landau, Rosalind Dixon, & Yaniv Roznai, From an Unconstitutional Constitutional
Amendment to an UnconstitutionalConstitution?Lessons From Honduras, GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM

(forthcoming 2019), 8, https://ssm.com/abstract-3208185.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 10.
76. Id.

2018]

DEMOCRA TIC BACKSLIDING

361

secret; 77 it also insisted that minority rights in parliament not be squelched. 78
In another decision, the Court held that the Speaker of the House could not
simply ignore motions of no confidence. 7 9 The Court held that the motion of
no confidence acts to "strengthen regular and less 'fatal' accountability and
oversight mechanisms". 8 0 Parliament had a duty to hear such motions, which

it considered "a vital tool to advance our democratic hygiene".81 The Court
supported its findings by referring to the practice of executive removal in
India, Canada, the United Kingdom, and several other Commonwealth
82
jurisdictions which possess parliamentary democracies.
What about the rule of law? This ideal implicates not just courts and
lawyers, but any government agent whose actions must be constrained by
legal authority. Again, South Africa illustrates how courts can help to ensure
the rule of law in a complex system with multiple institutions. During the
South African period of democratic decay, the prosecuting and investigating
institutions of the state were not particularly active in seeking to hold Zuma
accountable. Only the Public Protector, an ombudsman-like body with
relatively weak powers, seemed to be willing to challenge Zuma's behavior.
In a critical decision, the Supreme Court empowered the Public Protector,
whose findings were given legal force, resolving an ambiguity in the
Constitution.83 The Public Protector had issued a report that followed an
investigation into the use of public funds for the improvement of the
President's personal residence.84 The report concluded that money misspent
on portions of the upgrades were to be repaid by the President.8 5 The
President failed to comply with the findings, claiming that they constituted
mere "recommendations". When the Court held that such findings were
legally binding and that the President was not entitled to disregard them,
President Zuma had to follow the Protector's order that he repay state monies
77. United DemocraticMovement v. Speaker of the NationalAssembly and Others 2017 ZACC 21
at para. 97 (S. Aft.).
78. Oriani-Ambrosini,MP v. Sisulu, MP Speaker ofthe NationalAssembly 2012 ZACC 27 at para.
51 (S. Afr.); Mazibuko v. Sisulu andAnother 2013 ZACC 28 at para. 45 (S. Afr.); DemocraticAlliance v.
Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2016 ZACC 8 at para. 45 (S. Afr.); see generally James
Fowkes, Zuma's South Africa: A ConstitutionalPost-Mortem, INT'L J. CONST. L. BLOG, Mar. 28, 2018,
at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/
2018/03/zumas-south-africa-a-constitutional-post-mortem-i-connect-column/.
79. Mazibuko v. Sisulu andAnother 2013 ZACC 28 at para. 45 (S. Aft.).
80. United DemocraticMovement v. Speaker ofthe NationalAssembly and Others 2017 ZACC 21
at d., para. 34 (S. Afr.).
81. Mazibuo, supra note 44, at para 43.
82. Id. at para 46.
83. Economic Freedom Fightersv. Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic
Alliance v. Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2016 ZACC I1 at para. 105 (S. Aft.).
84. Economic Freedom Fightersv. Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic
Alliance v. Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2016 ZACC 11 at paras. 2-3 (S. Aft.).
85. Economic Freedom Fightersv. Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic
Alliance v. Speaker of the NationalAssembly and Others 2016 ZACC 11 at para. 2 (S. Aft.).
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Importantly, the Public Protector's report
spent on his private home.
concluded that in receiving undue benefits from the state, the President had
breached his constitutional obligations. 86 Many regarded this statement, now
with the force of law, as fulfilling the criteria for impeachment in terms of
section 89(1) of the Constitution. This decision was, in its timing, the final
blow that led the ANC to jettison Zuma as its leader in favor of Cyril
Ramaphosa, who replaced Zuma mid-term as president. In short, the South
African Constitutional Court forced the political system to act: it did not
directly remove the president but it ensured that the processes of democratic
accountability could not be ignored.
The fourth modality is the manipulation of the public sphere, including
attacking or controlling the media and academia. A particular threat in our
era is to undermine the very notion of an objective truth, instead promoting
the idea of "fake news" and creating false narratives. Courts can play several
roles here. First, courts can demand that information be disclosed, under
Freedom of Information laws and other statutes, helping to ensure
transparency. This can facilitate accountability by the media. (Of course, this
does not mean that courts actually do play these roles. Analysis of Freedom
of Information Act cases in the United States, shows a good deal of deference
by the courts when the government invokes the national security exemption
from disclosure.) 87 Courts can protect the media by ensuring robust freedoms
of the press and speech, as well as by preventing government from restricting
them.
Courts can also serve to preserve evidence from being destroyed. An
interesting recent case in this regard arose in Wisconsin, where an advocacy
group accused of an illegal campaign contribution had its electronic records
seized." The case stemmed from alleged collusion between the groups and
Governor Scott Walker's recall campaign in 2011. State courts eventually
found that there had been no legal violations, and ordered the documents
returned, but also asked that a copy of some documents be filed under seal at
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The advocacy group then sued. Concerned
about retaliatory proceedings, the defendants filed a copy of the documents
with the federal District Court as well, asking that they be kept until the case
against them was finally resolved. Clearly the defendants were worried about
the risk of destruction of evidence, including by government actors.
A third role courts can play in protecting the public sphere is by finding
facts. When reality is contested, fact-finding by judges-one of the core
86.

PUBLIC PROTECTOR, SECURE IN COMFORT 439 (March 2014).

87. Susan Nevelow Mart and Tom Ginsburg, [Dis] Informing The People's Discretion: Judicial
Deference Under The National Security Exemption of the Freedom of Information Act, 66 ADMIN. L.
REV. 725 (2014) (demonstrating rarity of finding against government.)
88. John K. MacIver Institute For Pub. Policy Inc. v. Schmitz, 885 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 2018).
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functions of the judicial process-can serve to provide authoritative
determinations of contested issues. When courts are trusted, (as they
generally are in the United States), they can serve as arbiters of truth, even
though of course legal determinations are made under conditions of
incomplete information and limited time.
Finally, courts can and do play a role of supervising elections in many
countries. Countries with special constitutional courts will not infrequently
position those courts as the final arbiters of elections disputes. 89 And scholars
focused on the "Law of Democracy" explain how it is that courts can play a
role in regulating the democratic process. 90
In short, modem constitutional democracy involves the subjection of
democratic will to the rule of law. This is in part historically determined. For
most Western democracies, the rule of law was in place well before the
establishment of mass democracy. But it is also conceptual, rooted in the
basics of constitutional theory going back to the ancient Greeks, who
distrusted direct and unmediated popular power. By requiring that the people
act through law, the tule of law subjects the state to certain processes of
orderly change, which helps to make democracy effective. Democratic
choice is underpinned by legal guarantees of the rights to organize, speak,
and protest.
It is precisely this harmonious vision of the rule of law and democracy
that has come under severe attack from illiberal democrats in recent years.
The problem is not so much with the rule of law in the abstract but in its
concrete manifestation in the decisions of judicial bodies, who have been
empowered in the last decades as liberal democracy has spread around the
globe. Partly the process is dialectic: as courts have become more important,
they have become targets. As Huq and I put it, "the central role played by
the courts perversely raises the stakes in political battles over who controls
the courts." 9 ' The judicialization of politics has led to the politicization of the
judiciary.
The most complete articulation of the new theory has come from Polish
figures in the Law and Justice Party (PiS,) who have systematically portrayed
the law as subordinate to popular will. As PiS leader Kaczyfiski himself said
"the state based on the rule of law does not have to be a democratic state. In
a democracy, the only sovereign is the nation. The parliament and, in the
89. See, e.g., 1998 CONST. OF THE REP. OF ALBANIA, art. 131(e) (court verification of election
results); See generally Tom Ginsburg and Zachary Elkins, Ancillary Powers of ConstitutionalCourts, 87
Texas Law Review 1431, 1443 (2008) (providing data).
90. Nathaniel Persily, The Law of Democracy, 143 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (2004) (introducing
symposium); Samuel Issacharoff, et al., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL

PROCESS 2 (2nd ed. 2002); Pamela S. Karlan, New Beginning and DeadEnds in the Law of Democracy,
68 OHIO ST. L. J. 743 (2007) (anti-entrenchment vs. anti-discrimination rationales).
91. HOW TO SAVE, supra note 1, at 174.
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Polish conditions, the President are its representatives. These two state
organs are responsible for the creation of law. To these bodies belongs the
control over our lives." 92 Notice that the courts are not mentioned. It is this
simplistic privileging of democracy over liberalism, while at the same time
ignoring democracy's legal foundation, that leads to subvesion of the law and
turn it into an instrument for partisan struggle. As the honorary speaker of
the Polish parliament said, "it is the will of the people, not the law that
matters, and the will of the people always tramples the law." 9 3
CRISIS AND REGIONAL RESPONSE IN POLAND

IV.
A.

The backsliding

To understand the playbook for attacking courts, let us examine the
situation in Poland in more depth. In 2015, the PiS candidate, Alexander
Duda, won the presidential election in Poland. The next year, the party won
a parliamentary majority under the leadership of former Prime Minister
Jaroslaw Kacynzski. Kacynzski is the de facto leader of the party, and has
engineered a remarkable turnaround in Polish politics.
In the wake of the election victory, the outgoing party sought to pack the
Constitutional Tribunal by appointing five new justices to the fifteen-member
tribunal.94 The incoming PiS majority refused to seat the incoming justices
and then engineered a clever series of steps to take control of the
constitutional tribunal. 9 5 To do so, it had to first force the Constitutional
Tribunal to seat its own judges, and not those that had been elected by the
lame duck session of the outgoing parliament. It did so by passing a new
appointments law, and then refusing to publish the Constitutional Tribunal
decision which held that law unconstitutional.9 6 With the personnel of the
Court in crisis, there was a stalemate for several months. But in late 2016, as
the outgoing Tribunal President's term expired, the PiS passed a statute
establishing a position of "interim president" of the Tribunal. Its appointee,
Julia Przylebska, convened a meeting with some of the controversial
appointees, and then forced the Tribunal's Vice President to retire. Finally,
after several months, in October 2017, the Constitutional Tribunal handed
down ajudgment "cleansing" the improperly elected "duplicate" judges, and

92. Adam Balcer Beneath the surface of illiberalism: the recurring temptation of 'national
democracy' in Polandand Hungary, WISEEUROPA 6, 47 (2017) https://pl.boell.org/sites/default/files/
beneaththesurface illiberalism nationaldemocracyjpoland-hungary.pdf
93.

Tamas Gyorfi, AGAINST THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 62-63 (2016).

94. See Sadurski, supra note 34.
95. Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, The Capture of the Polish ConstitutionalTribunaland Beyond:
OfInstitution(S), Fidelitiesand the Rule ofLaw in Flux, 43 REV. CENTRAL & E. EUR. L 116 (2018).
96. Id. at 121.
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finding several laws passed by Parliament but declared unconstitutional by
the prior Constitutional Tribunal to now be constitutional.97
With the Constitutional Court in hand, the PiS moved against the ordinary
judiciary. It first passed laws to take control of the National Council of the
Judiciary, which has a role in both appointing and managing judges. 98 As in
Hungary, age restrictions were an attractive option, as the most senior judges
were precisely those with the most interest in and capacity for upholding the
rule of law. By lowering the maximum age from 70 to 65, PiS decapitated
the judiciary in a single. stroke, forcing out 40% of the Supreme Court. 99
In reaction, some scholars have called for extraordinary measures. For
example, Professor Koncewicz has asserted that ordinary courts could have
tried to resort to emergency judicial review, temporarily claiming jurisdiction
over constitutional issues that would otherwise be exclusively within the
Tribunal's purview, on the grounds that the Tribunal is incapacitated. 00 He
argues that in a situation where the alternative is the complete destruction of
the system, the courts would be justified in taking that liberty as a matter of
self-defense.' 0' But in any case, the argument was academic, in that there
was no concrete reaction or mobilization.
Indeed, the PiS initiated a series of reforms targeting the ordinary
judiciary that would bring the courts under heel. As this was happening, the
rest of the European community took notice, but didn't take much action.' 0 2
The PiS Party capitalized on the lack of reaction from the international
community and the strategic gridlock it created domestically to continue
expanding its power and reducing constitutional oversight.10 3 Scholars,
however, called on Europe to act.1 04

97. Id. at 122.
98. Sadurski, supra note 34.
99. Sadurski, Polish ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court Under Pressure: What Now?, VerfBlog
(May 7, 2018), https://verfassungsblog.de/polish-chief-justice-of-the-supreme-court-under-pressurewhat-now/, DOI: https://doi.org/10.17176/20180705-161545-0; see also Monika Nalepa, The Attack on
Polands Judicial Independence goes Deeper than you Think, MONKEY CAGE, July 23, 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/23/the-attack-on-polands-judicialindependence-goes-deeper-than-you-think-here-are-5-things-to-know/?utm term=-.e79098de9e78.
100. Koncewicz, supra note 95, at 147.
101. Id. at 143.
102. Id at 135.
103. Id.
104. Kim Lane Scheppele and Laurent Pech, Was the Commission Right to Activate pre-Article 7
and Article 7(1) ProceduresAgainst Poland?, VerfBlog, (July 3, 2018), https://verfassungsblog.de/wasthe-commission-right-to-activate-pre-article-7-and-art-71-procedures-against-poland/, DOI: https://dx.
doi.org/10. 17176/20180307-091937.
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The European response

The tools of the European Union for protecting democracy are relatively
limited. Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty on the European Community states a
set of core values, including democracy and the rule of law.105 But the remedy
for imposing costs on a Member State are relatively limited. Article 7 of the
Treaty allows for the suspension of the rights of a Member State on a
unanimous vote (excluding the state concerned) but there is no mechanism
for expelling a state entirely. 10 6 The procedure requires a proposal, approved
by a two-thirds majority in the European Parliament, which in turn leads to a
vote by the Council to declare a "clear risk of serious breach". 10 7 In the event
of a serious and persistent breach, 108 the country can be declared to be in
breach by the European Council, and can vote by qualified majority to
suspend rights. 109 This has never happened, and there is skepticism that it
could, given the fact that Hungary, a fellow traveler regime, would be able to
exercise a veto over the final stage under Art. 7.3.
The European Commission began an inquiry into the rule of law in
Poland in January 2016. This led to a back and forth with the government.
But in December 2016, the European Commission issued a Rule of Law
Opinion on the situation in Poland, expressing concern with (1) appointment
of judges to the Constitutional Tribunal and the non-implementation of
judgments, (2) Law amending Law on Constitutional Tribunal and
implementation of judgment on and since 9 Mar 2016, and (3) Effectiveness
of constitutional review of new legislation enacted in 2016.110
In July 2016, the Commission proceeded to the second stage of preArticle 7 procedure and issued a Recommendation on the Rule of Law. It
noted that the amendments flagrantly flouted the Commission's Opinion, by
including provisions that were previously found to be unconstitutional by the
Constitutional Tribunal and had been criticized by the Venice Commission.
The Commission's eariler opinion had explicitly asked that the law respect
the findings of the Constitutional Tribunal and take the Venice Commission's

105. The Treaty of Lisbon, art. 2, May 9, 2008, 51 O.J. (C 115) ("The Union is founded on the
values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member
States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality
between women and men prevail.").
106. Id at art. 7.
107. Id. at art. 7.1.
108. Id at art. 7.2.
109. Id at art. 7.3.
110. Koncewicz, supra note 95, at 134-35.
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Opinion into account."'
In July 2017, the Third Rule of Law
Recommendation was issued by the European Court of Justice.' 12
In October 2017, the European Parliament adopted a resolution
concluding that the current situation in Poland presented a clear risk of a
serious breach of the values referred to in Article 2.113 This was followed by
the European Commission (EC) proposing to adopt a decision against Poland
under Article 7(1) TEU, for presenting a risk of a serious breach of the rule
of law.'1 4 Meanwhile, on 2 July 2018, the EC initiated infringement
procedure and sent a Letter of Formal Notice to Poland regarding its Law on
the Supreme Court."'
All in all, however, there does not seem to be many tools for applying
formal sanctions to a country that violates the provisions of Article 2. There
are shame sanctions, and it is notable that the Venice Commission on
Democracy through Law, an organ of the Council of Europe, issued several
opinions criticizing the Polish judicial reforms.' 16 But these were not binding
in any legal sense.
However, the European judicial system provides one mechanism that has
recently emerged. In Ministerfor Justice and Equality v. LM ("the Celmer
case"), the European Court of Justice has been tasked with determining
whether or not Ireland can refuse to execute a Polish European Arrest Warrant
(EAW) for alleged drug trafficker Artur Celmer.11 7 The reason given for a
possible refusal to execute is that recent judicial reforms in Poland - in the
opinion of the Irish High Court - have undermined the rule of law and
challenged the presumption of "mutual trust" under which EAWs operate." 8
The Irish High Court cites several statements by the Venice Commission and
the initiation of Article 7 TEU proceedings against Poland as evidence of its
claim.' 19 As far as judicial independence is concerned, the Celmer case seeks
to answer two questions: which legal test should be used to make a decision
regarding Celmer's surrender, in light of the lack of judicial independence

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id
Id. at 136.
Id. at 165 n.107.
Id at 166.
European Commission Press Release IP/18/4341, Rule of Law: Commission launches

infringement procedure to protect the independence of the Polish Supreme Court (Jul. 2, 2018),

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEX-18-4343_en.htm.
116. Venice Commission: Poland'srecent reforms constitute "grave threat" to judiciary, HUMAN
RIGHTS EUROPE (Dec. 8, 2017), http://www.humanrightseurope.org/2017/12/venice-commissionpolands-recent-reforms-constitute-grave-threat-to-judiciary/.
117. Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM [2018] (Ir.), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
documentjsf?docid=204384&mode=req&pagelndex=1&dir-&occfirst&part-1&text-&doclang=EN&
cid=1212288.
118. Id
119. Id
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that the Irish High Court has observed in Poland? And, how the Article 7
TEU proceedings and Venice Commission statements should factor into
EAW surrender assessments (if at all)?
The standard, as argued by the Advocate General (AG) Evgeni Tanchev
is based on earlier cases. Ireland must apply the double test established in
when making a determination on Celmer's surrender. That is, the Irish High
Court must not only consider whether the judicial system as a whole allows
for a fair trial, but also whether Celmer's individual case is likely to face a
"flagrant denial" of justice. The AG argued that Ireland could take into
account the Article 7 proceedings and the Venice Commission reports.
In short, the European response to the attack on Poland's courts has been
halting and limited, but may be picking up steam. It will, however, likely be
too late to completely reverse the degradation of the Polish courts and the rule
of law. This then suggests that, if democratic backsliding is to be avoided,
the main dynamics will be domestic. Democracy must, in some sense, save
itself, and this is the challenge we confront today in many countries around
the world.
V.

CONCLUSION: WHAT CAN BE DONE?

To reiterate the argument so far, democracies are under threat all over the
world, and courts have a potential role to play in helping prevent backsliding.
But they are not foolproof. Indeed, as courts have become more powerful and
prominent, through the global trend of the judicialization of politics, they
have themselves become targets for political actors' intent on capturing
power. This has led to a rash of attacks on judicial independence.
How can one ensure that the courts remain capable of playing their role
in protecting democratic channels? There is a large literature on the causes
and consequences of judicial independence, but there is no foolproof
mechanism. One trend has been to empower a special institution, called a
judicial council, to manage and oversee the judiciary, sometimes being
involved in the appointment process and other times working on
appointments, promotions, removal, and budget. In many cases, judicial
councils have themselves become targets for politicization.120 In other work,
my co-authors and I have found that only the combination of insulated
constitutional appointment processes and protection against removal
enhanced judicial independence in fact. 121
One of the lessons of the backsliding literature is that courts need allies.
Sometimes these can be inside the country. The stories described above about
120. DAVID KOSAR, PERILS OF JUDICIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES (2016).
121. James Melton & Tom Ginsburg, Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter? A
Reevaluation of Explanations for Judicial Independence? 2 J.L. COURTS 187 (2014).
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the way the South African court interacted and supported the parliamentary
opposition and the Public Protector are suggestive: together they formed a
network of institutions that was able, ultimately, to prevent Jacob Zuma from
taking over the political system entirely. In other cases international legal
institutions, including international courts, can play an important role. 12 2
They can do so through outside pressure, as in the Polish case recounted
above, or through providing resources for domestic courts to leverage. The
bottom line, then, is that the rule of law cannot survive without democratic
support, even as democracy cannot survive without the rule of law.

122. Alejandro Chehtman, Internationallaw and ConstitutionalLaw in Latin America, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN LATIN AMERICA (Conrado Hubner Mendes & Roberto

Gargarella eds., Forthcoming, 2019), available at https://papers.ssrn.con/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=32
07795.

